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At least since Anaximander’s apeiron, there have been philosophical ques-
tions about what, if  anything, preceded the gods.1 But, as far as I know, 
the precise question that I address in this essay was ﬁ rst explicitly asked by 
Ronald W. Hepburn, in his essay ‘Restoring the Sacred: Sacred as a Concept 
of  Aesthetics’.2 He cites two sources for his question: Martin Heidegger and 
Gaston Bachelard. While, in his ‘Letter on Humanism’, Heidegger does not 
ask the question in so many words, he does make some characteristically 
suggestive remarks in this direction: 
In such nearness [i.e., of  Being], if  at all, a decision can be made as to 
whether and how God and the gods withhold their presence and the 
night remains, whether and how the day of  the holy dawns, whether 
and how in the upsurgence of  the holy an epiphany of  God and the 
gods can begin anew. But the holy, which affords a dimension for the 
gods and for God, comes to radiate only when Being itself  beforehand 
and after extensive preparation has been illuminated and is experienced 
in its truth.3
Bachelard is more explicit. In his Poetics of  Space, in the context of  a discus-
sion of  a poem by Pierre-Jean Jouve, he writes: ‘Pierre-Jean Jouve’s “forest” 
is immediately sacred, sacred by virtue of  the tradition of  its nature, far from all 
history of  men. Before the gods existed, the woods were sacred, and the gods 
came to dwell in these sacred woods.’4
 1 H. B. Gottschalk, ‘Anaximander’s Apeiron’, Phronesis, 10 (1965), 37–53, 50.
 2 Ronald W. Hepburn, ‘Restoring the Sacred: Sacred as a Concept of  Aesthetics’ in 
idem, The Reach of  The Aesthetic: Collected Essays on Art and Nature (Aldershot, 2001), 
113–27.
 3 Martin Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi & J. Glenn Gray 
in David Farrell Krell (ed.), Basic Writings: Martin Heidegger (rev. edn; London, 1993), 
213–65, 242.
 4 Gaston Bachelard, Poetics of  Space, trans. Maria Jolas (Boston, 1994), 186.
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In his essay, Hepburn is interested in the actual and potential relationships 
between religious and aesthetic uses of  the concept of  the sacred. Which leads 
him to the question: Does the concept have a valid meaning – an aesthetic 
meaning, say – that is logically independent of  (and therefore might have 
preceded) the religious one, which seems most strongly associated with the 
metaphysical belief  that God or the gods exist? In other words, is the sacred 
older than the gods? It is important to note that Hepburn’s approach to this 
question is synchronic, rather than diachronic. He is not so much interested in 
the historical development of  ideas as their logical relationships. He helpfully 
provides further explication of  what the rather poetic afﬁ rmative answers of  
Heidegger and Bachelard are actually claiming, as he reads them:
In less poetic terms, it is being claimed that we can make sense of  
‘sacred’ without having already ‘grasped’ deity. ‘God is holy’ is not an 
analytic truth. If  it were analytic, believers would be unable to rejoice 
in his holiness, singing ‘Sanctus, sanctus, sanctus’ with thankfulness and 
wonder. The logic here is parallel with the familiar analysis of  ‘God 
is good’. To be able to praise God for his goodness, or to see ‘God is 
good’ as ‘news-giving’, cannot be simply a linguistic matter. ‘Sacred’, 
then, will also be logically independent of  the concept of  deity – ‘older 
than the gods’; and does it not follow that it is a concept we can deploy 
whether or not there is a God?5
While he does not provide a deﬁ nitive answer, Hepburn adumbrates his view 
on whether this claim is correct. In this essay, I set out my own answer within 
the guidelines that Hepburn’s sketch has laid out.
1 The sacred and the gods
In order to address the question, we must ﬁ rst ask, what does Hepburn mean 
by ‘the sacred’ in the familiar religious sense? He speciﬁ es six elements:
(i) A cognitive disclosure of  a non-temporal divine reality that pervades
   the universe.
 5 Hepburn, ‘Restoring the Sacred’, 116.
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(ii) Following Rudolf  Otto and Mircea Eliade, a reference to something
    other than the forces of  nature.
(iii) Yields access to a sense of  life as meaningful or worthwhile.
(iv) Worthy of  respect or veneration; not to be used as a means to ends.
(v) Ineffable.
(vi) Indispensable work done by background beliefs – e.g., refers to
    something actualised in God.6
We can see that many of  these elements of  the meaning of  the sacred imply, 
if  they do not actually refer to, God or the gods. They all seem, at ﬁ rst glance, 
compatible with the belief  that God or the gods exist. The ﬁ rst, second, and 
fourth elements strongly imply a divine object of  some sort. The ‘background 
beliefs’ mentioned in the sixth are metaphysical beliefs – and God is explicitly 
given as the exemplar of  an object in which a sense of  the sacred is typically 
actualised. Even the ﬁ fth element of  ineffability (which I shall discuss in more 
detail), Hepburn explains in terms of  an ‘ineffable intentional object’, which 
might well be a god. Here, he shares the perspective of  many theologians, who 
explicate the notion of  divine ineffability in the same terms. This series of  
strong connections between the sacred and the gods that Hepburn draws in 
the course of  deﬁ ning the former concept leads him, perhaps rather predict-
ably, to sketch a negative answer to our central question. Referring back to 
belief  in the existence of  God or the gods, he writes, at the very end of  his 
essay:
to hold those religious-metaphysical meanings consistently in abeyance 
inevitably draws off  much of  what attracts us to the term [‘sacred’] in 
the ﬁ rst place. Perhaps centuries of  Christian theism have so impreg-
nated ‘sacred’ with its religious relational qualities – belonging to God, 
emanating from God – that those strands are by now unsuppressible, 
cannot admit of  bracketing, but reassert themselves whether we like 
it or not, and no matter whether the sacred was or was not older than 
God or the gods.7
We may note that Hepburn does not quite tell us whether he thinks the 
sacred is older than the gods – but he gives us reason to think he doubts it. 
He certainly ventures the thought that there may be signiﬁ cant difﬁ culties 
 6 Ibid., 113–14.
 7 Ibid., 127.
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involved in treating the concept of  the sacred as logically independent from 
the concept of  deity, given how intimately the two concepts have been associ-
ated with one other – and for how long.
2 Why the sacred is older than the gods
My own answer tends in the opposite direction because I think quite differently 
about the concept of  ineffability, which appears as Hepburn’s ﬁ fth element of  
the meaning of  the sacred. It is worth pointing out that his move here is not 
unusual – the concept of  ineffability has been an integral part of  almost every 
philosophical discussion of  religious experience since the early 1900s, when 
William James identiﬁ ed ineffability as one of  the ﬁ ve ‘marks’ of  mystical 
experience.8 I think that together with the third (the one about yielding access 
to a sense of  life as meaningful), this element is of  greatest importance when 
it comes to understanding the meaning of  the sacred. I am also of  the opin-
ion that, rightly interpreted, these two complementary elements are logically 
incompatible with all the other elements that Hepburn lays out for us.
Firstly, my reasons for attaching such importance to the notion of  inef-
fability owe to an argument put forward by David Cooper.9 That argument 
concludes that the only way we can terminate the regression regarding meaning 
that results when we search for ultimate meaning is by appeal to the concept of  
ineffability. It is only by appeal to the concept of  ineffability, therefore, that we 
can explain the meaning of  Life as a whole.10 And I agree with Hepburn that, 
if  the concept of  the sacred has any meaning at all, it will be as an appropriate 
designation for that which supplies ultimate meaning and therefore explains 
the meaning of  Life. If  this is right, then the meaning of  the concept of  the 
sacred must be equivalent to that of  ineffability. Here, the concept of  inef-
fability is understood to refer to what in principle resists conceptual grasp and 
literal linguistic articulation. And meaning is deﬁ ned as a relation of  appropri-
ateness that something has to a context broader than itself, and ultimately a 
relation of  appropriateness to human Life. Very brieﬂ y, this is how Cooper’s 
argument goes.
 8 William James, The Varieties of  Religious Experience (New York, 1958), 292–3.
 9 David E. Cooper, ‘Life and Meaning’, Ratio, 18 (2005), 125–37; idem, The Measure 
of  Things: Humanism, Humility, and Mystery (Oxford, 2002).
10 The capitalization, which I adopt here, is used by Cooper to evoke Wilhelm 
Dilthey’s ‘das Leben’, which rules out purely biological senses of  the term.
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If  the meanings of  things, the concepts and values with which we invest 
them, must be explained in terms of  their contribution to human concerns, 
practices, and projects – and therefore ultimately in terms of  their relation of  
appropriateness to the human perspective (the world of  human Life to which 
those practices and concerns themselves contribute) – how can Life itself  and 
as a whole be said to have meaning? The answer is: only by placing it in a rela-
tion of  appropriateness to what is beyond itself, independent of  the human 
contribution, and ultimately real. This ‘beyond’ cannot, without circularity, be 
invested with the concepts and meanings that constitute Life – which it is 
invoked to explain – therefore it must be ineffable.
Secondly, the problem with Hepburn’s explication of  ineffability in terms 
of  some object is incoherent because it implies a familiar self-reference antin-
omy. In the literature on ineffability, it has been pointed out ad nauseam that 
we must be able to say enough about a putatively ineffable object to secure 
reference to it, identifying it as that to which the ineffability applies. And if  we 
can say even this much about an object (as we must of  any putatively ineffable 
object) that object cannot be ineffable by deﬁ nition. In other words, even the 
bare, essential claim ‘x is ineffable’ seems enough to violate the ineffability 
of  x. Cooper’s argument implies, to similar effect, that it is impossible, with-
out circularity, to invest the ineffable with the concepts, meanings and values, 
with which Life itself  (and its constituents) are invested – whose meaning is 
already in question. From the phenomenological and pragmatist philosophi-
cal perspectives on which I draw, the concept of  existence must be included 
among these. Here is Leszek Kołakowski reading the father of  phenomenol-
ogy, Edmund Husserl ‘“Existence” itself  is a certain “sense” of  an object. 
Consequently it would be absurd […] to say that an object “exists” indepen-
dently of  the meaning of  the word “to exist” – independently of  the act of  
constitution performed by the consciousness.’11
And ﬁ nally, from a different (but complementary) philosophical angle, 
Silvia Jonas, in her recent study of  the metaphysics of  ineffability, has thor-
oughly dismissed ‘objects’ (alongside ‘properties’, ‘propositions’, and ‘content’) 
as plausible candidates for the relevant, non-trivial kind of  ineffability.12
If  my views on the importance of  the concept of  ineffability and the inco-
herence of  the notion of  an ineffable object are right, those ‘religious-relational 
11 Leszek Kołakowski, Husserl and the Search for Certitude (London, 1975), 65.
12 Cf. Silvia Jonas, Ineffability and Its Metaphysics: The Unspeakable in Art, Religion, and 
Philosophy (Basingstoke, 2016), ch. 3; Guy Bennett-Hunter, Ineffability and Religious 
Experience (London, 2014).
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qualities’, which Hepburn rightly notices have impregnated the term ‘sacred’ 
for centuries, begin to evaporate. If  the sacred has to be ineffable in order 
to be sacred, and if  the term ‘ineffable’ cannot by deﬁ nition be coherently 
applied to any objects, then an experience of  the sacred cannot be the experi-
ence of  some object, including any gods. It follows that the concept of  the 
sacred, not only can but must be regarded as logically independent from the 
concept of  deity.
The sacred is indeed older than the gods.
Silvia Jonas suggests that we understand the metaphysics of  ineffability in 
terms of  ‘Self-acquaintance’, an experience in which the ‘object’ turns out to 
be nothing other than the ‘subject’ – our primitive point of  view on the world, 
for which there are any objects at all. I think it is for this reason that, in the 
closing pages of  her book, Jonas begins to use the terms ‘experience of  ineffa-
bility’ and ‘ineffable experience’ interchangeably. If  the ‘subject’ becomes the 
‘object’ of  an experience which for that reason shipwrecks the subject–object 
distinction, it will in that case seem quite natural to say that an ‘ineffable expe-
rience’ amounts to an ‘experience of  ineffability’ and vice versa.13
From a different angle, I follow phenomenologists like Karl Jaspers and 
Gabriel Marcel to argue to the same effect: that the relevant kind of  experi-
ence, an experience of  ineffability – which we might call ‘religious experience’ 
– shipwrecks the subject–object split. That split is best viewed, with John 
Dewey, as a useful distinction to be transcended rather than a dichotomy.14 
Marcel distinguishes between a ‘problem’, which can be dissolved by rational 
thought, and a ‘mystery’, which eludes such objectiﬁ cation. He deﬁ nes a 
mystery as ‘a problem which encroaches upon its own data’.15 And the inef-
fable dimension of  reality that Jaspers signiﬁ cantly calls ‘Transcendence or 
God’ is for him strictly interdependent with human existence. Both exist-
ence and Transcendence are modes of  reality as a whole, which he calls ‘the 
Encompassing’. While we could, for the provisional purposes of  analysis, 
say that Transcendence lies on the objective side of  the encompassing, and 
existence lies on the subjective side, Jaspers insists on their interdependence. 
There is no existence without Transcendence: human existence is only real-
ized in the presence of  Transcendence, and Transcendence is, as it were, created 
13 Guy Bennett-Hunter, ‘New Work on Ineffability’, Expository Times, 128 (2016), 30–2.
14 John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known (Boston, 1949), 
https://www.aier.org/sites/default/ﬁ les/otherpublications/KnowingKnown/
KnowingKnownFullText.pdf, accessed 10 October 2013.
15 Gabriel Marcel, ‘On the Ontological Mystery’ in idem, The Philosophy of  Existence, 
trans. Manya Harari (London, 1948), 1–31, 8.
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in the same moment that it is revealed to us. Jaspers sets this out as follows: 
‘The encompassing that we are confronts the encompassing that is Being 
itself: the one encompassing encompasses the other. The being that we are 
is encompassed by encompassing Being, and Being is encompassed by the 
encompassing that we are.’16
Not only is the sacred older than the gods, but the word ‘sacred’ cannot 
coherently be interpreted to refer any object at all. Twentieth-century theology 
has coped with this disconcerting fact by means of  a post-Heideggerian move 
known as the critique of  ontotheology (‘ontotheology’ being the jargon for a 
system of  theology in which God is regarded as a being, especially the Supreme 
Being). Theologians have continued to use the traditional theistic language, 
while continually reminding the reader (with varying degrees of  success, it 
has to be said) that the word ‘God’ does not refer to a being. Among others, 
Paul Tillich,17 Simone Weil,18 John Macquarrie,19 and Vito Mancuso20 have all 
argued (I think rightly) that, if  we are to think of  God as the explanation for 
everything that exists, the sacred ground and source of  Being itself, we cannot 
also think of  him as one of  the things that exist – a thought which would intro-
duce circular reasoning into theological explanation. And this is, of  course, a 
thought that has much more ancient roots in Christian Neoplatonism, as well 
as branches that extend far out to the fringes of  orthodoxy.
We can tell from the fact that they do not completely jettison the tradi-
tional theistic language (though they radically modify theistic concepts) that 
these contemporary theologians have recognized something important: while 
the concept of  the sacred may be logically independent of  the concept of  
deity, it does not follow that the language of  deity is completely irrelevant to 
the concept of  the sacred. So, I now want to set out some thoughts on how 
the relationship between the language of  deity and the concept of  the sacred 
should be construed. This task will involve some contextualization of  the meta-
physical language that Hepburn observed to have dominated for ‘centuries of  
16 Karl Jaspers, Philosophical Faith and Revelation, trans E. B. Ashton (London, 1967), 71.
17 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (3 vols, Welwyn, 1968), I, 227, 262–3, 301.
18 Cf. Rowan Williams, ‘Simone Weil and the Necessary Non-Existence of  God’ in 
idem, Wrestling with Angels: Conversations in Modern Theology (London, 2007), 203–27.
19 John Macquarrie, In Search of  Deity: An Essay in Dialectical Theism (The Gifford Lectures 
Delivered at the University of  St Andrews in Session 1983–4) (London, 1984), 186.
20 Cf. Corneliu C. Simut ̦, ‘Vito Mancuso in English: Presenting the Thought of  a 
Contemporary Radical Catholic Theologian and Philosopher to the English-
Speaking World’, Expository Times, 128 (2016), 20–9.
Guy Bennett-Hunter20
Christian theism’ – a language whose resonance he thought ‘unsuppressible’ 
when considering the concept of  the sacred.
3 The concept of  the sacred and the language of  deity
So my question is: how best to resolve the tension between a concept of  
the sacred as ‘older than the gods’ (logically independent of  that of  deity) 
and the likely unsuppressible language of  metaphysical theism? Given that 
the sacred is indeed ‘older than the gods’, Hepburn assumes that the familiar 
problems with metaphysical theism constitute a strong rational demand to 
jettison theistic language completely – or at least regard it as outdated and 
completely irrelevant to the concept of  the sacred, which is best restored to 
its more rationally acceptable aesthetic context. But he justiﬁ ably regards this 
demand as unrealistic, given how deeply entrenched theistic language is in the 
history of  Western thought. I admire Hepburn’s pragmatism, but given his 
inability to accept theism, he is caught in a dilemma. We cannot accept theism, 
given the familiar rational problems with it, but neither can we realistically 
jettison theistic language, given its cultural entrenchment. What, then, do we 
do? I have been arguing that the central role of  ineffability precludes us from 
understanding the sacred in terms of  objects – for example, in terms of  theis-
tic beliefs. So, if  the sacred is indeed older than the gods, and theistic language 
is indeed unsuppressible, we need some account of  how that theistic language 
(and other forms of  religious expression) should be heard in relation to the 
concept of  the sacred.
For our theological criticizers of  ontotheology, this account is provided 
by theories of  religious symbols. Such theologians maintain the identiﬁ cation 
I afﬁ rmed between the concept of  the sacred and that of  ineffability. This 
implies that it is, in the words of  Tillich, ‘an insult to the divine holiness to 
talk about God as we do of  objects whose existence or non-existence can be 
discussed’.21 But, for these religious thinkers, it does not follow from this, in 
turn, that religious expression should be abandoned – just reinterpreted in 
symbolic terms, in order that it may become an iconic form of  expression, 
rather than a conceptually idolatrous one.
There are many reasons to be dissatisﬁ ed with a symbolic reading of  reli-
gious expression, and I cannot go into detail here.22 But I want to contrast the 
21 Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 301.
22 For more detail, see Bennett-Hunter, Ineffability and Religious Experience, 67–75.
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idea of  symbols with what Jaspers calls ‘ciphers’, comparing the latter favour-
ably with the former.
Brieﬂ y, the main problem is that symbols are objects which symbolically 
represent other objects, even if  these objects are imaginary and do not exist 
outside the symbolic representation. To take a prosaic example, a symbol 
operates like a road sign indicating a nearby tourist attraction. But the concept 
of  the sacred evokes an ineffable reality that transcends the subject–object 
distinction and is no representable object. It is therefore incumbent upon the 
defender of  religious symbols to explain how a symbol (which is something 
within the subject–object distinction) can represent, or otherwise manifest, a 
transcendent reality that is unconditioned by that distinction. In my view, this 
is an impossible task. What we need are Jaspers’ ‘ciphers’, which are similar to 
symbols, but, crucially, have an ambiguous relationship to the subject–object 
distinction. It is by means of  this cardinal ambiguity that Jaspers thinks ciphers 
embody ‘Transcendence or God’, which outruns that distinction, enabling us 
to transcend it.
Ciphers embody Transcendence, which is ineffable, in the only way that it 
can be embodied – they do not consist in statements about it, or otherwise 
represent it. Jaspers provides two metaphors to help us better understand how 
this happens: one of  ‘language’, the other of  ‘physiognomy’. Ciphers, he says, 
are the language of  Transcendence (not Transcendence itself). This metaphor 
stresses the intimacy and immediacy of  the relationship between ciphers and 
transcendence. It is not that a cipher is Transcendence, any more than the 
phonemes of  a language are what a sentence of  that language means. But 
Transcendence needs ciphers to be realized, just as linguistic meaning needs 
concrete phonemes. But unlike symbols and spoken languages, the language of  
a cipher is untranslatable and remains indecipherable. What a cipher embodies 
does not exist outside it and is not independently accessible. When T. S. Eliot 
says in The Waste Land, ‘I will show you fear in a handful of  dust’, only the 
most pedantic reader would try to translate the poetry into prose, insisting that 
Eliot made a category error because a handful of  dust cannot literally contain 
fear. When we read this phrase as a cipher of  the ineffable, we see that the 
poetic language evokes what is already there, embodied in the sonority, the 
emotional and cultural resonance, of  the poetry itself.
The physiognomic metaphor corrects the balance. Jaspers describes 
how a person’s involuntary gestures express something of  his or her being. 
Similarly, with ciphers, Jaspers writes, ‘all things seem to express a being […] we 
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experience this physiognomy of  all existence’.23 Whereas human physiog-
nomy arguably expresses something that’s accessible in other ways (through 
empirical psychology, say), Transcendence is accessible only in and through its 
cipher physiognomy. Jaspers says, ‘This transparent view of  existence is like a 
physiognomic viewing – but not like the bad physiognomy aimed at a form of  
knowledge, with inferences drawn, from signs, on something underneath; it is 
like the true physiognomy whose “knowledge” is all in the viewing.’24
But human physiognomy is arguably just the same. Is what an angry gesture 
expresses located in some separate mental shrine beyond the angry person’s 
body? Or is the anger inescapably bound up with, and realised through, the 
body and its gestures? Fellow phenomenologists, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and 
Hans-Georg Gadamer both argue, in Gadamer’s words, that ‘what a gesture 
expresses is “there” in the gesture itself  […] [it] reveals no inner meaning 
behind itself ’.25 Giving the example of  a heated conversation with an angry 
person who is expressing his anger by gesticulating and shouting, Merleau-
Ponty observes that ‘I could not imagine the malice and cruelty which I discern 
in my opponent’s looks separated from his gestures, speech and body’.26 He 
continues, with poetic eloquence:
None of  this takes place in some other-worldly realm, in some shrine 
located beyond the body of  the angry man. It really is here, in this room 
and in this part of  the room, that the anger breaks forth. It is in the 
space between him and me that it unfolds. I would accept that the sense 
in which the place of  my opponent’s anger is on his face is not the same 
as that in which, in a moment, tears may come to his eyes or a grimace 
may harden on his mouth. Yet anger inhabits him and it blossoms on 
the surface of  his pale or purple cheeks, his bloodshot eyes and wheez-
ing voice … And if, for one moment, I step out of  my own viewpoint 
as an external observer of  this anger and try to remember what it is like 
for me when I am angry, I am forced to admit that it s no different […] I 
am forced to acknowledge that this anger does not lie beyond my body, 
23 Karl Jaspers, Philosophy, trans. E. B. Ashton (3 vols, Chicago, 1969), III, 125.
24 Ibid., III, 134.
25 Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘Image and Gesture’ in Robert Bernasconi (ed.), The Rele-
vance of  the Beautiful and Other Essays, trans. N. Walker (Cambridge, 1986), 74–82, 79.
26 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The World of  Perception, trans. Oliver Davies (London, 2004), 
83.
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directing it from without, but rather that in some inexplicable sense it is 
bound up with my body.27
Whether or not Merleau-Ponty is correct about human physiognomy, the 
point of  Jaspers’ metaphor remains: ciphers are signiﬁ cations without there 
being any object signiﬁ ed. As he puts it, ‘Signiﬁ cation is itself  only a metaphor 
for being-a-cipher’.28
So ciphers are ambiguous with regard to the subject–object distinction. 
Like languages, they are cultural phenomena that are both created and appro-
priated by us. Without us, there would be no ciphers. Yet ciphers must be 
appropriated from cultural and intellectual traditions that are older and greater 
than we are. In the terms of  the subject–object distinction, Jaspers says, 
ciphers are subjective and objective at once.29 It is through this ambiguity, 
which symbols lack, that ciphers can embody Transcendence, which outruns 
the subject–object distinction, eluding our cognitive and literal linguistic grasp.
Ciphers lie not only on the border between subject and object but also 
between the aesthetic and the religious – a boundary that greatly interested 
Hepburn and even motivated the question that I have been addressing in this 
essay. Ciphers are what George Steiner, in an aesthetic context, called ‘real 
presences’ – the meaningful embodiments, in printed letters, brush strokes, 
and so forth, of  an ineffable, transcendent reality that can be embodied in 
no other way. For Steiner, close attention to the way in which meaning is 
‘incarnated’ in works of  art – analogous to the Real Presence of  Christ in the 
Eucharist – raises the question of  an ultimate guarantor of  meaning, which we 
might choose to evoke using theistic language. Note that it does not provide 
us with a deﬁ nite answer to this question, nor does it imply the existence of  a 
being called ‘God’. In his essay ‘Aesthetic and Religious: Boundaries, Overlaps 
and Intrusions’, Hepburn quotes Steiner as he raises the twofold question 
‘Is there or is there not God? Is there or is there not meaning to being?’.30 
Hepburn (and he is not alone) sees an impermissible conﬂ ation here. He asks, 
‘could one not afﬁ rm that meaning exists, without thereby afﬁ rming that God 
27 Ibid., 83–5.
28 Karl Jaspers, Truth and Symbol: From Von der Wahrheit, trans. J. T. Wilde, W. Kluback 
& W. Kimmel (London, 1959), 42.
29 Karl Jasp ers, Philosophy is for Everyman: A Short Course in Philosophical Thinking, trans. 
R. F. C. Hull & G. Wels (London, 1969), 93–4.
30 Ronald W. Hepburn, ‘Aesthetic and Religious: Boundaries, Overlaps and Intrusions’ 
in idem, The Reach of  the Aesthetic, 96–112, 103. Cf. George Steiner, Real Presences 
(London, 1989), 220.
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exists also?’31 The same query underwrites James Wood’s strident critique of  
Steiner’s notion of  Real Presences and his naïve conclusion that ‘in the end 
all [Steiner] offers is a hedged secularism written up religiously’.32 But Steiner 
is not here making an attempt at modus ponens. The point is that questions in a 
theological register (but not answers) are prerequisite to a full understanding 
of  the meaning of  artistic creation – and, indeed, of  meaning in general. The 
ultimate guarantor of  meaning turns out to be an ineffable reality that cannot 
be described (religiously or otherwise), only bodied forth in ciphers: works of  
art, literature, pieces of  religious language, and ritual performances – phenom-
ena which evoke but do not describe.
The fact that ciphers are untranslatable into other terms brings to mind 
Jaspers’s published debates with the New Testament theologian Rudolf  
Bultmann, who attempted to ‘demythologize’ religious myths, translating 
their meaning, which he viewed as symbolic, into the secular terms of  the 
early Heidegger’s existentialist philosophy.33 If  religious myths are best seen 
as untranslatable ciphers rather than symbols, then it will be impossible to 
demythologize them without hollowing out their religious meaning, leaving 
only an empty shell behind. But Bultmann’s premise remains valid: that we no 
longer share the ancient world view out of  which the New Testament texts 
emerged. Jaspers concurred that, in the ancient world, the cipher language was 
also the public language – as he put it, ‘It was the air you breathed.’34 Belief  
in spirits, for example, was taken for granted. On this, too, Hepburn is very 
instructive. In his essay, ‘The Gospel and The Claims of  Logic’, he points out 
that the difﬁ culty is not just that ancient beliefs are no longer ‘in the air’ but 
that beliefs are no longer warranted in the same way. ‘What serves in the New 
Testament account as the grounding and certifying of  revelation is, to us, part 
of  the collapsed world view itself.’35
The solution to this state of  affairs is not to demythologize religious 
expression, nor abandon it entirely. (If  Hepburn is right about its persis-
tent cultural entrenchment, then abandoning it was never a realistic option.) 
31 Hepburn, ‘Aesthetic and Religious’, 103.
32 James Wood, ‘Toppling the monument’, prospectmagazine.co.uk, 20 December 1996, 
https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/topplingthemonument, accessed 
1 August, 2018.
33 Karl Jaspers and Rudolf  Bultmann, Myth and Christianity: An Inquiry into the Possibility 
of  Religion Without Myth, trans. s.n. (New York, 1958).
34 Jaspers, Philosophical Faith and Revelation, 104.
35 Ronald W. Hepburn, ‘The Gospel and the Claims of  Logic’ in [Hubert Hoskins 
(ed.),] Religion and Humanism (London, 1964), 11–18, 14.
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Rather, we should re-read it as a cipher of  Transcendence. Jaspers strongly 
resisted the idea that there could ever be a deﬁ nitive system of  ciphers, but 
he allowed that a system of  thought could be read as a cipher among others.36 
When discussing the theological implications of  his theory, Jaspers described 
the metamorphosis that the reading of  religious expression as a cipher would 
effect. ‘Dogmas, sacraments, rituals would be melted down, so to speak – 
not destroyed, but given other forms of  conscious realization. […] Not the 
substance, but the appearance in consciousness would change. Philosophy and 
theology would be on the road to reuniﬁ cation.’37
In conclusion, we cannot know whether the language of  theistic metaphys-
ics is unsuppressible, as Hepburn supposed, but we may observe that it has 
so far proved remarkably resilient, even to the deconstructive spirit of  demy-
thologizing. But assuming that Hepburn was correct, the answer is not to take 
theistic language literally and become mired in the hackneyed rational difﬁ cul-
ties of  old-style philosophy of  religion. Neither is it to reject the language as 
false or formally meaningless, barring all access to the sacred, understood in 
terms of  a most likely non-existent divine object. Nor is it to demythologize 
the language, retaining it only for the purposes of  translation into the secular 
terminology of  aesthetics or Heideggerian philosophy. The answer is rather 
to read religious language (and I think religious expression more generally) as 
ciphers of  Transcendence, which may body forth the sacred in the only way 
that it can be bodied forth. This ‘melting down’ of  religious expression does 
not immediately destroy theistic language but allows it to be differently inter-
preted, to appear in consciousness in altered forms. Jaspers was hopeful that, 
carried on in relation to religion, this process of  cipher-reading could clear 
the overgrown path between Athens and Jerusalem. Whether this reuniﬁ ca-
tion will eventually supress theistic language altogether remains to be seen. In 
answer to the question raised by Ronald Hepburn, then, not only is the sacred 
older than the gods, but it may outlive them as well.
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